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Abstract
This paper analyzes the potential of one-step transfer prices based on either variable or full costs for
coordinating decentralized production and quality-improving investment decisions. Transfer prices
based on variable costs fail to induce investments on the upstream stage. In contrast, transfer prices
based on full costs provide strong investment incentives for the upstream divisions. However, they fail
to coordinate the investment decisions. We show that negotiations prevent such coordination failure.
In particular, we find that the firm benefits from a higher degree of decentralization so that total profit
increases in the number of parameters being subject to negotiations.
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1 Introduction
In the literature, different transfer-pricing
schemes are recommended depending on the pur-
pose they are intended for. On the one hand, two-
step transfer prices consisting of a unit price com-
pensating for variable production costs and an
up-front lump-sum payment to cover fixed costs
are suggested for the purpose of coordinating in-
vestment and production activities within divi-
sionalized firms (e.g., Drury 2004: 900). On the
other hand, the OECD recommends among oth-
ers a cost-plus scheme for international taxation
(OECD 1999: II-11). Empirically, one-step cost-
based transfer pricing prevails in business practice
(see Section 2). However, it is well known from the
literature that cost-based types of transfer prices
exhibit significant disadvantages with respect to
investment incentives in decentralized settings.
Taking into consideration that these investments
constitute a crucial strategic competitive advan-
tage, finding an adequate transfer-pricing policy
is an important managerial issue. As an example,
consider today’s markets where firms have the op-
portunity to attract customers’ attention by prod-
uct differentiation. The responsibility for product
improvements and development or for ensuring
high quality is typically placed not on one but on
several divisions. Plausibly, improving the quality
of the final product is achieved by joint activities of
the divisions, meaning that in divisionalized firms
coordination of such kind of activities is necessary
in order to exploit synergistic effects.
The goal of our paper is to analyze the invest-
ment incentives generated by one-step cost-based
transfer prices. Our theoretical analysis builds on
the empirical fact that these transfer prices pre-
vail in business practice. We start by replicating
the well-known investment distortions for variable
cost-based and full cost-based transfer prices. Cou-
pled with the empirically observable dominance of
cost-based transfer prices this is themotivation for
analyzing the potential of negotiations for mitigat-
ing the investment incentive problem by varying
the extent of negotiations.
The major innovation of our paper is that we do
not only account for interstage but also for in-
trastage dependencies of the divisions’ investment
decisions. This means that we analyze interdepen-
dencies across the stages -- as it is commonly done
in the literature -- as well as goal conflicts between
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divisions on the same stage. This modification
enables us to analyze interesting coordination is-
sues on the upstream stage and to demonstrate
how negotiations between the divisions and the
extent of delegation influence the performance of
transfer pricing. In doing so, we also resolve the
dichotomy of cost-based and negotiated transfer
prices. Moreover, we do not conceive transfer pric-
ing as a separate incentive system which can be
optimized in isolation. Rather, we consider the as-
signment of decision rights within the firm also
as variable. We demonstrate that central manage-
ment may reach better coordination by delegating
more -- rather than fewer -- aspects of the transfer-
pricing system, which has important managerial
implications.
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 provides a brief literature review.
The organizational setting is described in the third
section together with the underlying assumptions.
Section 4 contains the model results for differ-
ent settings. Initially, the first-best solution is de-
rived. Subsequently, we demonstrate that none
of the considered schemes is able to induce in-
vestments in all of the three divisions. Moreover,
transfer pricing based on full costs is prone to
suffer from coordination failure. In this context,
introducing negotiations on both the investments
and the transfer prices is shown to ensure optimal
coordination. The paper concludes with manage-
rial implications. Appendices A and B contain the
proofs and an example, respectively. Additional
explanations concerning the negotiations under
transfer pricing based on full costs are provided in
Appendix C.
2 Related literature
Related literature falls into an empirical and a
theoretical strand. From an empirical perspec-
tive, it can be confirmed that one-step cost-based
transfer-pricing schemes prevail in business prac-
tice. This observation is supported by the survey
of empirical studies in Horngren, Datar, and Fos-
ter (2006: 774). It is confirmed and extended by
Ernst & Young (2001: 19) who document the pre-
dominance of cost-based transfer-pricing schemes
irrespective of the type of transaction in the con-
text of international taxation. It is valid to build on
the findings of Ernst & Young (2001) in our con-
text because Ernst & Young (2003: 17) find that
80 percent of 641 multinational parent companies
use the same transfer price for managerial and tax
purposes. Czechowicz, Choi, and Bavishi (1982:
59) find a corresponding share of 84 percent. Fur-
thermore, although two-step transfer prices pro-
vide more flexibility by allowing for a lump-sum
transfer payment to cover fixed costs, empirical
evidence suggests that the prevalence of two-step
transfer prices is extremely low: According to Tang
(1993: 71), only one percent of 143 firms employ
two-step schemes to price national or international
transfers. With respect to the question of whether
transfer prices are administered or negotiated, the
survey byHorngren, Datar, and Foster (2006: 774)
seems to document a rather low prevalence of ne-
gotiated transfer prices ranging between 11 and
26 percent. Yet, Eccles points out a shortcoming of
many empirical studies which do not consider ne-
gotiations given a certain pricing scheme. Accord-
ingly, referring to firms that transfer at a profit
markup based on a given scheme, Eccles (1985:
43) states that ’’seventy-two percent of these firms
said yes’’ when asked ’’if some kind of negotiation
was also involved.’’
From a practical as well as a theoretical per-
spective, coordination is an important function
of transfer prices, see, e.g., Drury (2004: 883) or
Grabski (1985: 35). This becomes evident with the
introduction of relation-specific investments, see,
e.g., the seminal papers of Edlin and Reichelstein
(1995, 1996)orHolmstromandTirole (1991)where
the hold-up problem is highlighted. Extensions
have been made by Baldenius (2000), Wielen-
berg (2000), Anctil and Dutta (1999), and Balde-
nius, Reichelstein, and Sahay (1999). All these
papers focus on freely negotiated transfer prices,
i.e., without a given pricing scheme, or on the
comparison of negotiated and cost-based transfer
prices. Sahay (2003) analyzes additive versusmul-
tiplicative markups on costs, whereas Lengsfeld,
Pfeiffer, and Schiller (2006) analyze the compara-
tive advantages of transfer prices based on actual
and standard costs. All these contributions assume
investments inducing a reduction of production
costs or an increase in sales revenue. The consid-
ered investments might be called ’’egoistic’’ since
it is assumed that it is the investing division which
directly benefits from the induced returns (see Che
and Hausch 1999, for a similar terminology).
Similar to the papers cited above, we consider
the problem of motivating divisional investments
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via transfer prices. We also rely on negotiations
to overcome interest conflicts between the divi-
sions. However, we do not distinguish between
cost-based transfer prices on the one hand and
negotiated transfer prices on the other. Instead,
we follow an integrated perspective by extend-
ing the solution space provided by administered
cost-based transfer prices by inter-divisional ne-
gotiations on the specification of the given pricing
scheme. Another difference of our setting is that
the divisions invest knowing the specified trans-
fer price and that each investment’s productivity
depends on the other investment levels. Thus, the
problem of coordinating investments has to be
solved in the first place instead of a hold-up prob-
lem potentially occurring after the investments
have been made.
Only a few other papers have incorporated coop-
erative -- instead of egoistic -- investments into
transfer-pricing settings. Our investment setting is
similar to Johnson (2006) or Chwolka and Simons
(2003). In contrast to their approaches, we con-
centrate on transfer prices instead of sharing rules
and incorporate negotiations.Moreover, analyzing
three divisions enables us to illustrate two differ-
ent kinds of coordination problems: On the one
hand the coordination among the upstream divi-
sions which is typically neglected in the literature
and on the other hand the ’’traditional’’ coordina-
tion problem between upstream and downstream
divisions.
The contribution of our paper results from the in-
troduction of a second upstream division. Given
the traditional setting with one upstream and one
downstream division, it seems obvious that the
firm faces an overinvestment problem on the up-
streamproduction stagewhen transfer prices cover
full costs plus a multiplicative markup. In our ex-
tended setting, we not only confirm this intuition
but show also that an underinvestment problem
may occur as well. More importantly, we show
that ensuring investments and production does
not only require solving the coordination problem
between the production stages, but also between
thedivisionson the samestage.Accordingly,we ex-
amine how negotiations over the investment levels
induces coordination on the upstream production
stage. We extend the analysis by demonstrating
that the firm benefits from having the upstream
divisions not only negotiate investments but also
transfer prices.
3 Model description
We consider a firm consisting of three investment
centers Di, i ∈ {1,2,3}, being subordinated to
headquarters, HQ. HQ confines itself to installing
a transfer-pricing system -- where transfer prices
do not necessarily have to be administered -- for
coordinating the investment centers. We assume
that transfer prices have to be defined before any
activities take place. One justification for this as-
sumption are requirements demanded by tax au-
thorities or other legal requirements.HQ delegates
any operative decision to the divisions, including
those referring to the investment levels Ii. All divi-
sions have access to external factor markets where
they procure the required rawmaterials and goods
-- except for the intermediate products which are
exclusively traded between the divisions. The up-
stream divisions D1 and D2 deliver intermediate
goods or services to the downstream division D3
and are compensated via transfer-price payments.
The downstream division completes the product
and sells it to an external market. These general
assumptions are fairly standard and depicted in
Figure 1 where ci symbolizes the variable costs per
production unit accruing in division Di before ac-
counting for transfer payments, whereas t1 and t2
are the transfer prices at which each product unit
of D1 and D2 is valued. Ii denotes the investment
level and equals the expected investment costs. x is
the production and sales quantity, and p(·) is the
expected sales price.
In the following, we explain the assumptions in
more detail. We assume that divisionalization is
given. Headquarters is not able to calculate opti-
mal investment levels because it lacks information
onproductivity parameters. Consequently,HQdel-
egates the investment and trade decisions to the di-
visionmanagers. Ex post,HQ can neither verify the
investment levels nor evaluate their optimality, but
can only observe the corresponding actual costs.
However, the investment costs resulting from the
chosen investment levels are stochastic.
Having a closer look at thedivisions, note that from
the perspective of organizational theory a major
advantage of decentralization is greater flexibility
with respect to market demands (see Grabski 1985
for reasons in favor of decentralization). This fact
is incorporated in our model by the assumption
of information asymmetry between headquarters
and the divisions. Further, we assume that the
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division managers are interested in their respec-
tive divisional profit. This assumption could be
justified by the existence of an according incen-
tive system. The investment-center organization
induces self-interested divisional decisions so that
any formal or informal agreement between the
divisions has to be in the interest of each of the
divisions. Communication between the divisions is
therefore of no use unless the resulting agreement
is self-enforcing. Note that the three divisions -- in
contrast toHQ -- share perfect information as to the
transaction under consideration. This assumption
ismotivated by the fact that the operative divisions
have a deeper knowledge of product-specific data
as compared toHQ.
The two-stage production process is performed by
the three divisions as depicted in Figure 1. The
intermediate products cannot be sold externally so
D1 and D2 are obliged to deliver their products to
D3.D3, in turn, has to procure these specific inter-
mediate goods from D1 and D2 because they are
not offered on an external market. For analytical
convenience, all production coefficients are equal
toone.Themaximalproductquantity x¯ > 0 reflects
capacity restrictions, i.e., x ∈ [0, x¯]. As motivated
later in the paper, the investments considered here
do not affect capacity.
The most important objective of modern firms
relying on decision decentralization is to handle
the fragmentation of product responsibilities. This
holds true especially when the competitive ad-
vantage is based on product differentiation. This
problem is integrated into our model by focusing
on quality-improving investments. Note that the
term ’’investment’’ has to be interpreted in a wide
sense in our paper. We have in mind spendings
that are able to increase the customers’ willing-
ness to pay, which depends on the product-specific
bundle of features (Simon 1989: 1). These invest-
ments may be spendings for machines producing
at a higher quality level, research and develop-
ment expenditures implying an improvement of
the product’s functionalities, or organizational ar-
rangements speeding up service times and thus
increasing customer satisfaction.
The interrelated effects of the divisional invest-
ments are reflected by the sales price p which
depends on the individual investment levels and a
random variable ε. We have
(1) p˜(I1, I2, I3) = p(I1, I2, I3) + ε
with non-negative investment level Ii chosen by
Di, i ∈ {1,2,3}. An example with a specific price
function is presented in Appendix B. ε is a random
variable with mean μ(ε) = 0. Thus, the expected




= p(I1, I2, I3). As
argued above, the price is increasing in quality-
improving investments. Moreover, we assume that
p is strictly concave and bounded; additionally the
input factors’ contributions to the output cannot







= 0 ∀i, j ∈ {1,2,3}.
We assume that the costs resulting from invest-
ment level Ii, i ∈ {1,2,3}, are uncertain and
amount to C˜i(Ii) = Ii + κi ≥ 0, where κ1, κ2, and
κ3 are independent random variables with means
μ(κi) = 0. Thus, the expected investment costs
are given by Eκi[C˜i(Ii)] = Ii. Actual, i.e., realized,
investment costs are denoted by Ci.
In order to emphasize quality-improving invest-
ments we abstract from capacity increases and
thus leave the quantity effect on the sales price
out of account. Observe that this is a standard
assumption, e.g., in the target-costing literature.
In business practice, the quantity effect is negli-
gibly small in several environments: For instance,
in markets with a high brand loyalty, e.g., luxury
goods or certain food products, the price sensi-
tivity is low. Similarly, if the customer has made
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investments in the past, the present buying de-
cision might be predetermined. As an example
consider software updates. Generally, this phe-
nomenon arises whenever accessories have to be
bought for non-standardized products.
The timing of decisions and actions is as shown in
Figure 2. In the first step,HQ chooses a cost-based
transfer-pricing scheme, i.e., either schemevbased
on variable costs or scheme f based on full costs.
Additionally, the parameters determining the cho-
sen scheme respectively the extent of delegation
are specified. In the next step, the divisions si-
multaneously decide on their investment levels Ii,
i ∈ {1,2,3}, under perfect information, i.e., each
division knows its own as well as the others’ de-
cision problems. Subsequently, D3 determines the
production and sales quantity x. Finally, product
units are manufactured and sold, the sales price
is realized, and the realized investment costs are
determined, which allows the calculation of total
and divisional profits. We refer to HQ’s decision
making as centralized planning which defines the
conditions of the subsequent decentralized plan-
ning, i.e., investments and production.
We assume allmanagers andHQ to be risk-neutral.
The goal of HQ is to maximize expected total, i.e.,
firm-wide, profit:
(3)






























Observe that the divisional profits sum up to
total profit. Moreover, remember that c3 does
not account for any transfer prices but symbol-
izes the costs per unit for externally procured
inputs as depicted in Figure 1. We assume a
positive contribution margin which may be im-
proved by divisional investments. Formally, we
haveΠ(0,0,0, x) > 0 and ∂Π(0,0,0, x)/∂Ii > 0 for
x > 0 and i ∈ {1,2,3}.
For the first-best situation, we assume informa-
tion symmetry between HQ and the divisions. In
the second-best situation, we assume that variable
as well as realized investment costs are observ-
able and contractible so that the transfer-pricing
schemes introduced and analyzed in the follow-
ing below are feasible. However, HQ is not able to
observe the chosen investment level. This infor-
mation asymmetry is the reason forHQ to delegate
decision authority to the divisions and to imple-
ment a transfer-pricing system.
4 Model analysis
In this section, we first consider the first-best so-
lution. The two following subsections deal with
transfer pricing based on variable and full costs,
respectively. They deviate from the first-best situ-
ation in that there is information asymmetry be-
tween HQ and the divisions. We refer to them
as the second-best situation. We start the analy-
sis of the second-best situation by replicating the
well-known underinvestment problem for variable
cost-based transfer prices and the overinvestment
problem for full cost-based transfer prices. In par-
ticular, the transfer-pricing scheme v is based on
variable costs and induces investment incentives
only on the downstream production stage. Under-
investment occurs under this scheme since both
upstream divisions do not invest. In contrast,
scheme f is based on full costs and has the po-
tential to create strong investment incentives on
the upstreamproduction stage. Then, however, the
transfer price on its own is insufficient to induce
coordination among the divisions. We show how
negotiationsmay remedy this defect effectively and
may even align upstream divisions with the firm’s
objective.
Figure 2: Time line
profit generation and allocation
decentralized planning
centralized planning
and investment costs C˜i(Ii), sales, accounting
production, realization of sales price p˜(I1, I2, I3)
HQ specifies transfer prices t1 and t2
D3 decides upon quantity x
Di determines investment Ii, i ∈ {1,2,3}
(or delegates specification to D1 and D2)
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4.1 First-best situation
In the first-best situationwith information symme-
try betweenHQ and the divisions,HQ is able to de-
termine and enforce optimal divisional investment
levels and the optimal product quantity. Proposi-
tion 1 states the first-best solution. All proofs are
given in Appendix A. In Appendix B we calculate
the first-best solution for an example.
Proposition 1. The first-best quantity is xfb* = x¯.
The first-best investment levels Ifb*i , i ∈ {1,2,3},
are positive and finite.
With the price-quality relation as defined in equa-
tion (1) the corporate objective function is given
by (3). The first part of equation (3) represents
the total expected contribution margin per prod-
uct unit. By assumption, this margin is positive for
any combination of investment levels. Hence, it is
optimal for HQ to set the product quantity to its
maximum value.
4.2 Transfer prices based on variable
costs (scheme v)
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 reflect the second-best situa-
tion where HQ delegates decision authority to the
divisions and confines itself to administering the
transfer-pricing system. As a first step we analyze
the investment incentives of transfer prices based
on variable costs.
We assume that transfer prices under scheme v
are defined by tvi = (1 + γi)ci, i ∈ {1,2}, where
the multiplicative markup factors γi ≥ 0 ensure
non-negative divisional contribution margins on
the upstream production stage. Remember that
all division managers are risk-neutral and seek
to maximize their expected divisional profits. The
divisional objective functions Πvi read
(4)
Πvi (I1, I2, I3, x) = (t
v




= γicix − Ii
for the upstream divisions Di, i ∈ {1,2}, and
(5)



















p(I1, I2, I3) −
2∑
j=1
(1 + γj)cj − c3
)
x − I3
for the downstream division. Expected profits of
D1 and D2 equal the difference of the transfer
payment and the sum of the variable production
andexpected investment costs.Divisional expected
profits in (4) immediately show that the upstream
divisions have no incentive to invest at all under
scheme v replicating the underinvestment effect of
variable cost-based transfer prices.
In contrast to the upstream divisions, D3 receives
the actual turnover. In addition to its own vari-
able production and investment costs, D3 has to
account for the transferpayments toD1 andD2. Ac-
cordingly, it is only optimal for D3 to set a positive
product quantity, if its expected contribution mar-
gin is non-negative. Moreover, inducing a positive
investment on the downstream production stage
implies a non-negative expected profit forD3. This
requires sufficiently small markups. We have the
following equilibrium in divisional decisions.
Proposition 2. Presume that markup factors γ1
and γ2 under scheme v are sufficiently small so
that
(6) (γ1, γ2) ∈
{




(1 + γi)ci − c3 ≥ 0
}







> 0, and the product
is marketed, xv* = x¯.
With respect to the upstream divisions, transfer
prices based on variable costs seem to be inade-
quate for inducing investments. Accordingly, the
underinvestment problem on the upstream pro-
duction stage has to be managed by other organi-
zational arrangements.
4.3 Transfer prices based on full costs
(scheme f )
In this section, we analyze transfer-pricing
schemesbasedon full costswithdifferentorganiza-
tional embeddings. We start by showing that fully
administered transfer prices, i.e., without inter-
divisional negotiations, may result either in an
underinvestment or an overinvestment problem.
For the overinvestment problem, investment in-
centives on the upstream production stage are so
strong that further coordination in addition to the
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administered transfer prices is needed.Wedemon-
strate how negotiations on the investment levels
solve the coordination problem. For further im-
proving the investment levels we introduce fully
negotiated cost-based transfer prices which allow
for substantial improvements.
4.4 The divisional decision problems
with full cost-based transfer prices
For positive product quantities, transfer prices
based on full costs t˜fi , i ∈ {1,2}, are defined ac-
cording to






as full cost plus markup. Otherwise, with no sales,
transfer prices are zero.ωi symbolizes amultiplica-
tive markup factor determining divisional profits.
We restrict our analysis to multiplicative markups,
because transfer prices with additive markups do
not provide sufficiently strong investment incen-
tives for the upstream divisions. Note that due to
the uncertainty of the investment costs the trans-
fer prices based on full costs are also random
variables. Accordingly, the risk-neutral division
managers base their investment decisions on the
expected transfer prices tfi = (1 + ωi)(ci + Ii/x).
Calculation of the realized transfer prices requires
that the accounting system is able to measure the
realized investment costs Ci beside the variable
costs ci and the quantity x.
In case the product is marketed, x > 0, upstream
division Di’s, i ∈ {1,2}, objective function under
scheme f reads
(8)













= ωi(cix + Ii),







































All divisions incur a loss amounting to their corre-
sponding expected investment costs Ii, if no pro-
duction takes place. Again, the upstream divisions’
profits are calculated as transfer payment net of
production and investment costs. D3’s profit is
defined as turnover net of transfer payments, pro-
duction, and investment costs.
D3 chooses quantity














maximizing its expected contribution margin and
thereby its expected divisional profit Πf
3
(·). Note
that D3 bases this decision on an expected contri-
bution margin that does not only account for all
variable costs but also for the expected upstream
investment costs and a markup on all upstream
costs. This means, in turn, that the expected in-
vestment costs of the upstream divisions influence
the production decision whereas its own invest-
ment costs are sunk.
Under the assumption that production takes place,
i.e., xf (I1, I2, I3) = x¯, differentiating expected di-
visional profits with respect to the upstream divi-
sions’ investment levels I1 and I2 yields
(11)
∂Πfi (I1, I2, I3, x= x¯)
∂Ii
= ωi ∀i ∈ {1,2}.
Otherwise no division invests in order to avoid
a loss. Note that the derivatives in (11) suggest
an overinvestment problem with respect to the
upstream divisions as long as the markup factors
are positive. Loosely speaking, D1 and D2 increase
their divisional profits by incurring costs. In a
more general setting, where the investmentswould
reduce the production costs, it would not be clear
that the overinvestment problems of the upstream
divisions will occur with transfer prices based on
full costs. This would depend on the effect of the
investments on the sumof variable and investment
costs, which could be positive or negative, resulting
in an over- or underinvestment problem.
In the following, we discuss the results of different
organizational scenarios. We start with adminis-
tered transfer prices. Here two scenarios emerge
depending on whether inter-divisional negotia-
tions on the investment levels are prohibited or
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permitted. In the third scenario, wemodify our as-
sumption of a fully administered transfer-pricing
system and allow the upstream divisions to deter-
mine both the investment levels and the markup
factors in bilateral negotiations.
4.5 Administered transfer prices without
negotiations
In an administered transfer-pricing system a first
alternative for HQ is to choose negative markups.
Mathematically, this is a feasible solution, although
it appears to be uncommon from a business per-
spective.Withωi < 0divisionsD1 andD2 renounce
to any investment, whereas D3’s investment deci-
sion is the same as in the case of transfer prices
based on variable costs with small markup factors.
A second alternative for HQ are positive markups.
At first glance, expression (11) suggests that for
positive ω1 and ω2 both D1 and D2 have an incen-
tive to increase their individual investments un-
boundedly. However, excessive upstream invest-
ments would imply a negative contributionmargin
for D3 due to the corresponding high expected
transfer payments, i.e., p(I1, I2, I3) −
∑2
i=1(1 +
ωi)(ci + Ii/x¯) − c3 < 0, inducing the downstream
division to cease production at date t = 4 accord-
ing to (10). This implies negative profits for the
upstream divisions amounting to their sunk in-
vestment costs. Hence, it is not in the upstream
divisions’ interest to increase their investments to
an arbitrarily high level. Rather, it is optimal for
each upstream division to raise its investment to
the highest level that still induces the downstream
division not to cease production. Since both up-
stream divisions proceed in this manner, maxi-
mum investment levels depend on each other. The
solution to this problem requires an agreement of
the upstream divisions on one combination of in-
vestment levels ensuring thatD3 chooses a positive
quantity. In the absence of further coordination it
is therefore not obvious which investment levels
the upstream divisions should choose. Moreover,
infinitely many combinations of upstream invest-
ments can just be borne by D3.
Note that any solution leaving a positive contri-
bution margin to D3 is not self-enforcing. The
argument is as follows: Suppose the three divi-
sions agree on investment levels leaving a positive
contribution margin for D3. In this case each up-
stream division has an incentive to deviate from
thenegotiatedagreementand to increase its invest-
ment beyond the agreed level in order to increase
its respective profit, because with full cost-based
transfer prices as defined in (7), investment levels
and divisional profits are positively related for D1
and D2. Moreover, the upstream divisions can in-
crease their investment levels and D3 -- behaving
rationally -- does not cease production unless its
expected contributionmargin is negative. But then
the upstream divisions end up in a similar situa-
tion as before the negotiation:Without any further
agreement they do not know how to coordinate
investment increases. That is why we restrict our
analysis to negotiations between the two upstream
divisions leaving a zero expected contributionmar-
gin to D3.
To formalize this idea, let If
1,2 : R+ → 2R
2
+ denote
the set of combinations of upstream investments
being Pareto efficient with respect to upstream
expected divisional profits for given downstream
investment I3. There are two cases for the parame-
ter setting: On the one hand, it could be that there
does not exist any pair of upstream investment
levels greater than zero such that xf (I1, I2, I3) = x¯
holds for given I3. This is the case, e.g., if the
markup factors ωi are so high that D3’s contribu-
tion margin is negative for all positive investment
levels. Consequently, theupstreamdivisionswould





, and earn zero
profits. On the other hand, there could be at least
one pair of upstream investment levels such that
D3 decides to produce. In this case it is neither
individually rational for the upstream divisions
to choose zero investments nor a combination of
investment levels leaving a positive contribution
margin to D3 since by (8) they increase their own
profits by appropriately raising their investment
levels. Hence, any (I1, I2) ∈ If1,2(I3) solves
(12)
(
p (I1, I2, I3) −
2∑
i=1






(1 + ωi)Ii = 0.
This condition can be derived from (10) and is
equivalent to the fact that D3 just earns zero ex-
pected contributionmargin, if it decides to produce
at date t = 4. Put differently, with I(12)
1,2 (I3) ⊂ R2+
denoting the solutions to (12) in (I1, I2) we have
If
1,2(I3) ⊆ I(12)1,2 (I3).
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Scrutinizing condition (12), we note that it gener-
ally does not single out a unique pair of upstream
investments. Refer to the diagram on the left-hand
side of Figure 3 for an illustration of I(12)
1,2 (I3) for
three different pairs ω, ω′, and ω′′ of positive
markup factors (ω1,ω2). The corresponding divi-
sional profits are depicted in the diagram on the
right-hand side of Figure 3. Sinceweknow from (8)
that upstream divisional profits are increasing in
investments, any combination of upstream invest-
ments uniquely corresponds to a combination of
upstream divisional profits, and vice versa. Thus,
both diagrams of Figure 3 can be derived from
each other. Moreover, upstream investments be-
longing to the Pareto boundary of I(12)
1,2 (I3), denoted
by Iˆ(12)
1,2 (I3), are also Pareto efficient with respect to
upstream divisional profits. Pareto boundaries are
indicated by bold lines in Figure 3. Hence, the set
of upstream investments inducing Pareto-efficient






1,2 (I3) if Iˆ
(12)




1,2 (I3) = ∅
.
IfD1 andD2 are able to coordinate their decisions,
If
1,2 can be interpreted as D1’s and D2’s optimal
joint reactions. Interestingly, the Pareto boundary
Iˆ(12)
1,2 (I3) may include instances of underinvestment
as well as overinvestment, although D1 and D2
have strong incentives to overinvest expressed by
(11). Moreover, underinvestment corresponds to
high markup factors, and vice versa. In Figure 3,
parameter setting ω′′ induces upstream invest-
ments that are below the first-best levels for both
upstream divisions. The key to this observation
are the definitions of upstream profits in (8) and
(9): High markup factors on upstream production
costs imply that even small upstream investments
consume D3’s total contribution margin.
To summarize, administered transfer prices do not
yield a unique combination of upstream invest-
ment levels. Even though it is clear that a self-
enforcing solution always entails zero investment
of D3, the upstream divisions do not know which
combination of investment levels they should se-
lect from the set of Pareto-efficient investment
combinations satisfying (12). Hence, in the consid-
ered scenario with administered transfer prices
and decentralized operative decision authority,
further coordination is necessary.
4.6 Administered transfer prices with
negotiated investments
In the previous section we have shown that ad-
ministered transfer prices with positive markup
factors provide strong investment incentives for
Figure 3: Investments I(12)
























































The setting underlying both diagrams is p(I1, I2, I3) = p¯ − θ/
∏
3
i=1(ai + Ii)with p¯ = 30, θ = 50, a1 = a3 = 1, a2 = 2, x¯ = 1,
c1 = c2 = c3 = 1, and I3 = 0. The values of the markup factors are ω ≈ (2,4.31), ω′ ≈ (4,1.57), and ω′′ = (4,4).
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the upstream divisions. However, as both D1 and
D2 want to invest as much as possible such that
production is not stopped by D3 administered
transfer prices are not sufficient to provide ade-
quate coordination among all divisions. In this sec-
tion, the transfer-pricing system is supplemented
with inter-divisional negotiations on the invest-
ment levels. Note that the markup factors are still
assumed positive and remain under the control of
HQ. Refer to Appendix C for additional explana-
tions on negotiations under scheme f .
The negotiation result is an agreement between the
upstream divisions on a pair of investments (I1, I2)
satisfying If
1,2(I3), i.e., we assume (I1, I2) ∈ If1,2(I3).
In other words, the upstream divisions agree on
one joint reaction to given downstream invest-
ment I3 and thereby solve the coordination prob-
lem. Note that such an agreement between D1 and
D2 does not call for a formal contract, because
it is in the divisions’ interests to stick to the se-
lected equilibrium. Thus, the question to focus on
is not enforcement, but coordination. Since any
pair of such joint reactions entails zero contribu-
tion margin on the downstream production stage,
D3 never invests in equilibrium and there is no
point in the downstream division taking part in the
negotiations. This result is stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3. The equilibrium downstream
investment under scheme f with given positive
markup factors and negotiated upstream invest-
ments is If *
3
= 0.
The main idea of Proposition 3 is that transfer
prices based on full costs with positive markups
incite the upstream divisions to increase their in-
vestments at date t = 3 extracting all of D3’s con-
tribution margin at date t = 4. Consequently, D3
has no benefit associated to its investment and
thus does not invest. Proposition 4 uses this result
to derive the equilibrium production decision.
Proposition 4. The equilibrium product quan-
tity under scheme f with given positive markup
factors and negotiated upstream investments is
(14) xf * =
{
x¯ if Iˆ(12)
1,2 (0) = ∅
0 if Iˆ(12)
1,2 (0) = ∅
.
The top case of (14) is straightforward because a
solution of (12) is equivalent to D3 not incurring
a loss from production. The bottom case accounts
for the case that condition (12) has no solution.
On further inspection of this condition, we notice
that its solubility depends on the markup factors
which are set byHQ: For sufficiently large markup
factors revenue does not cover D3’s production
costs and the transfer payments, i.e., the left-hand
sideof (12) is negative.As a consequence,D3 ceases
production. We get the following existence result
concerning the markup factors.
Lemma 1. There exist (sufficiently small) posi-
tive markup factors such that I(12)
1,2 (I3) = ∅.
The followingproposition confirms that it is hence-
forth justified to restrict attention to sufficiently
small markup factors because otherwiseHQwould
never incur a positive total profit.
Proposition 5. Under scheme f with negoti-
ated upstream investments, (sufficiently large)
markup factors such that If
1,2(0) = ∅ and I3 = 0
are not optimal for HQ.
Moreover, total profit is entirely transferred to the
upstreamdivisions leavingD3with zeroprofit. For-
mally, with (I1, I2) ∈ If1,2(0) the equilibrium profit
allocation exhibits the propertyΠfi (I1, I2,0, x¯) > 0,
i ∈ {1,2}, and Πf
3
(I1, I2,0, x¯) = 0.
So far, the optimal upstream investments have
been conceived as the result of negotiations be-
tween D1 and D2. Anticipating the equilibrium
downstream decisions If *
3
= 0 and xf * = x¯, this


















1,2 contains all Pareto-efficient profits the
upstreamdivisions can achieve by their investment
decisions. Πf ,a
1,2 is indicated by bold lines in the di-
agram on the right-hand side of Figure 3. It clearly
shows that Πf ,a
1,2 depends on the markup factors.
Let Ifbi : R+ → R+ denote the first-best investment
of division Di, i ∈ {1,2}, for given I3. Analogous
to the computation to derive Proposition 1, we
get Ifbi (0) > 0. Then, we are able to establish the
following benchmark for inter-divisional negotia-
tions.
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Lemma 2 asserts thatHQmay choose markup fac-
tors such that -- from HQ’s perspective -- the most







is a feasible and Pareto-efficient re-
sult of the negotiations between D1 and D2. In
Figure 3 this is the case for settings ω and ω′.
Yet, generally the divisions only pick this point
by chance. Theoretically, the parties could apply
a cooperative solution concept which guarantees
the agreement on the most favorable combina-
tion of upstream investments. In fact, they would
come up with this second-best solution if they fol-
lowed the utilitarian solution, see Myerson (1981),
i.e., if they chose a combination of upstream in-
vestments that maximizes the sum of their profits
which equals total profit. However, if the outcome
of the negotiations followed the well-known Nash
bargaining solution as introduced in Nash (1950,
1953), the divisions would agree on investments
that maximize the product -- instead of the sum --
of divisional profits. Actually, it is not clearwhether
the upstream divisions want to implement a coop-
erative solution concept. Generally, they are free
to implement any arbitrarily chosen solution, so
that the most favorable combination of upstream
investments is not guaranteed. Hence, given the
bargaining situation in which HQ administers the
markup factors, it cannot be taken for granted
that the divisions agree on the first-best upstream
investments for I3 = 0.
Let us sum up the established results for scheme f
with positive markup factors and negotiated in-
vestments: First, in a situation with negotiated in-
vestment levels, D3 is left with zero profit because
any other agreement does not form an equilib-
rium in the investment game and is thus not self-
enforcing. Second, it is inHQ’s interest to set small
markups because a higher total profit is achieved
if production takes place. Third, even if the combi-
nation of first-best investment levels, given I3 = 0,
is a feasible result of inter-divisional negotiations,
the upstream divisions agree upon that solution
only by chance. The reason for this is that negoti-
ating the investment levels solely means that both
the generation and the allocation of profits are de-
termined in a single step. Thereby, the interests of
the division managers are typically not in line with
HQ when deciding on divisional investments.
The last point is illustrated in the diagram on the
right-hand side of Figure 3. The bold lines indicate
Pareto-efficient profit allocations forD1 andD2 for
given transfer prices. The thin, negatively sloped
line indicates feasible divisional profits if both up-
streamdivisions stick to their first-best investment
levels and agree upon the profit allocation sepa-
rately. Delegation of the transfer-pricing authority
to D1 and D2 means to make the thin line feasi-
ble. Thus, the upstream divisions can agree upon
investments inducing the second-best profit and
negotiate the profit allocation in a separate step.
This situation is analyzed in the following.
4.7 Negotiated transfer prices
We now consider a system of negotiated transfer
prices under scheme f , i.e., HQ delegates the au-
thority of specifying the markup factors ω1 and ω2
to the upstream divisions. Again, there is no point
inD3 taking part in the negotiations because, inde-
pendently of the (positive) markup factors, this di-
vision ends up with zero profit for any equilibrium
in the investment game, see expression (12) and
Proposition 3. The bargaining situation is different
now: D1 and D2 negotiate on both the markup
factors and their investment levels at the same
time. Let Πf ,n
1,2 denote the set of Pareto-efficient
upstream profits resulting from this negotiation.
Proposition 6 calculates Πf ,n
1,2.
Proposition 6. Πf ,n





) ∈ R2++ :









The idea of Πf ,n
1,2 is that the upstream divisions
choose investments that maximize total profit for
I3 = 0 and shift this profit by means of the markup
factors arbitrarily between each other. Consult the
diagram on the right-hand side of Figure 3 for an
illustration of Πf ,n
1,2. Π
f ,n
1,2 may be interpreted as the
envelope of all profit combinations that arise if









are a solution of
condition (12).
It is important that it does not matter to HQ in
this bargaining situation on which profit combi-
nation the upstream divisions actually agree since
any combination inΠf ,n
1,2 yields the same (maximal)
total profit. Thus, there is no dependency of aggre-
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gate efficiency on the special negotiation outcome.
Furthermore, a comparison of the two bargain-
ing situations suggests a remarkable conclusion:
It is possible to overcome dysfunctional incentives
rooted in responsibility-center organization by ac-
tually reducing the degree of central planning in
the form of delegating the transfer-pricing author-
ity.
5 Conclusions and managerial
implications
Transfer prices are a prominent instrument of
coordination in decentralized firms. This paper
focuses on the performance of simple cost-based
transfer-pricing schemes, which are prevailing in
business practice as to the coordination of invest-
ment and production decisions in a decentralized
setting of team production for inducing quality-
improving investments. In addition to the team-
production setting, we allow for two divisions on
the upstream production stage. The convergent
production structure is the driving force of the
identified coordination problems.
In a first step, we concentrate on the hypotheti-
cal first-best situation where central management
takes and enforces all decisions in an optimal way.
The second step is the analysis of the performance
of different transfer-pricing schemes applied in the
corresponding second-best situation.
Transfer prices based on variable costs are able to
induce coordination, but the upstream divisions
have no incentive to invest and the downstream
division maximizes total profit given the underin-
vestment of the upstream divisions. Accordingly,
additional organizational instruments, such as in-
vestment committees or mandatory minimal in-
vestment levels, are indicated.
In contrast to the variable cost-based scheme,
transfer prices based on full costs offer strong in-
centives for overinvestment on the upstream pro-
duction stage under administered transfer prices
with positive markups. Moreover, like in the vari-
able cost-based scheme with high markups, the
existence of two divisions on the same produc-
tion stage overcharges the coordination capability
of the transfer price. From an organizational per-
spective, investment budgets may mitigate this
problem but entail new agency problems. Another
solution approach is to choose negative markups
implying that the upstream divisions restrain from
any investment activities. With respect to divi-
sional investments and total profit, this solution is
identical to the schemebasedonvariable costswith
small markups. Therefore, a change of the orga-
nizational arrangements seems promising. Allow-
ing for negotiations between the upstreamdivision
managers on the investment levels yields a solution
to the overinvestment and coordination problem.
Nevertheless, first-best upstream investments can
only be guaranteed if negotiations include both
the investments and the markup factors. Thus, the
delegation of transfer-pricing authority may be a
viable option for HQ in order to improve coordi-
nation. Even though this paper concentrates on
quality-improving investments, there is probably
also potential to benefit from negotiations in situa-
tions where investments bear on production costs.
Comparing the different schemes for motivating
quality-improving investments, it holds true that
negotiations on transfer prices based on full costs
always guarantee at least a total profit as high as
administered transfer prices based on full costs
with positive markups and negotiated investment
levels. Other dominance relations depend on the
actual parameter setting. The strength of transfer
prices based on variable costs is the investment
incentiveon thedownstreamproduction stage.The
opposite is true for full cost-based transfer pricing.
Consequently, the former is the better choice if
the investments of the downstream division are
critical for the product’s quality compared to the
downstream investments, and vice versa.
Appendix A: Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The contribution margin which can be improved
by divisional investments is assumed to be pos-
itive, such that the maximal product quantity is
optimal. The objective function is assumed to be
strictly concave in the investment levels. The first-
order derivatives of the expected total profit with
respect to a single divisional investment level Ii,
i ∈ {1,2,3}, are assumed to be strictly positive
which yields the positive first-best investments
Ifb*i > 0, i ∈ {1,2,3}.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Inspecting (6) we conclude that
(17) p(I1, I2, I3) −
2∑
i=1
(1 + γi)ci − c3 ≥ 0
holds for any combination of (non-negative) in-
vestments and thus x = x¯ is an optimal quantity
decision for D3 independent of the divisional in-
vestments. As production is guaranteed by (17),
any positive investment on the upstream produc-
tion stage decreases the upstreamdivisions’ profits
given by (4) so that I1 = I2 = 0 holds in equilib-








such that choosing a strictly positive investment
level is optimal for D3.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
D3’s objective function for deriving the optimal









the optimal downstream investment in reaction
to upstream investments (I1, I2) ∈ R2+. Then, it
is sufficient to show that If
3
(I1, I2) = 0 holds for
(I1, I2) ∈ If1,2(I3).
Start with the assumption If
3
(I1, I2) > 0. Sup-








D3’s loss amounts to its investment costs and
If
3
(I1, I2) > 0 cannot be optimal since I
f
3
(I1, I2) = 0








= x¯. Since (I1, I2) ∈ If1,2(I3)
holds in equilibrium, condition (12) applies and
D3 again incurs a loss for every positive invest-
ment level. Consequently, If
3
(I1, I2) = 0 holds for
(I1, I2) ∈ If1,2(I3).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
The assertion uses Proposition 3 and follows
from (10) and (13). For Iˆ(12)
1,2 (0) = ∅, we have
(I1, I2) ∈ If1,2(0) = Iˆ(12)1,2 (0). Thus, condition (12)
is satisfied and thereby
xf (I1, I2,0) = x¯ holds for any (I1, I2) ∈ If1,2(0). Oth-
erwise the upstreamdivisions donot invest accord-
ing to (13) and p(0,0,0) −
∑2
i=1(1 + ωi)ci − c3 < 0
holds. Referring to (10), this implies xf (0,0,0) = 0
which completes the proof.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 1
p(I1, I2, I3) −
∑3
i=1 ci > 0 follows from the assump-
tion Π(0,0,0, x) > 0 for x > 0. Consequently, the
left-hand side of (12) is positive for I1 = I2 = 0
and sufficiently small markup factors ωi. As the
price function p is increasing and bounded in Ii,
i ∈ {1,2,3}, by the intermediate-value theorem
there always exists a pair of upstream investments
(I1, I2) = 0 satisfying (12) for any given I3.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Lemma 1 ensures existence of markup factors
ωi > 0, i ∈ {1,2}, such that If1,2(0) = ∅. Suppose
such markup factors are chosen. Then, by (13) and
Propositions 3 and 4, we have positive total profit
Π(I1, I2,0, x¯) > 0. Otherwise, total profit is zero
according to Π(0,0,0,0) = 0.
A.7 Proof of Lemma 2
As Ifbi (0) > 0, i ∈ {1,2}, the markup factors neces-




















1,2 (0). Evaluating the left-hand































Obviously, for sufficiently large markup factors









which is positive. Hence, by
the intermediate-value theorem there must be



























ismaximal for I3 = 0























A.8 Proof of Proposition 6
First note that the profit combinations in (16) are
Pareto efficient since theupstream investments are
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first best given I3 = 0. We then have to verify that
for each profit combination in (16) there is a pair of
markup factors described byLemma2 that induces
it. Let Ω ⊂ R2++ denote the set of pairs of markup
factors described by Lemma 2. We conclude Ω ={
(ω1,ω2) ∈ R2++ : ω2 = a − bω1
}
from (19), where
a and b are positive constants. Note that Ω defines
a negatively sloped line in R2++. For each pair of























. These profit functions

















is a parametrization of Πf ,n
1,2.
Appendix B: Example
To illustrate the general analysis developed in the
paper, this appendix presents analytical and nu-
merical results for a specific price function. Here
the interrelated effects of the decentralized in-
vestments are reflected by the sales price p˜ which
reciprocally depends onmultiplicatively connected
investment levels. We have






with investment level Ii ≥ 0 and costs C˜i(Ii) =
Ii + κi ≥ 0, i ∈ {1,2,3}, ai > 0 symbolizing the
capital stock of Di already in place, and constant
θ > 0 calibrating the investment effect. ε and
κi are independent random variables with mean
μ(ε) = μ(κi) = 0. The expected sales price and
















= Ii =: Ci ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1,2,3}.
Even with arbitrarily large investments in all di-
visions the supremum p¯ > 0 of the sales price
cannot be reached, as the marginal investment ef-
fect decreases with increasing investment levels as
depicted in Figure 4.
















Under the assumption (θx¯)1/4 > max{a1,a2,a3},
the first-best investment policy entails positive
investment levels in all divisions.
B.1 First-best situation
The first-best investment levels Ifb*i , i ∈ {1,2,3},
are given by
(24) Ifb*i = (θx¯)
1/4 − ai > 0.
Further, the optimal investment levels decrease
in initial endowments ai. The optimal solution is
characterized by (ai + Ii) = (aj + Ij) ∀i, j, which
reflects the decisions’ interdependence. With the
investment levels according to (24), the maximum






















This profit serves as a benchmark measuring or-
ganizational efficiency when we take the informa-
tional asymmetry into consideration.
B.2 Transfer prices based on variable
costs
With transfer prices based on variable costs and
sufficiently small markup factors γ1 and γ2, see
Proposition 2, the divisional investments in equi-









− a3 > 0.
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Interestingly, the level of Iv*
3
is independent of
the specific combinations of markups satisfying
condition (6). This is due to the absence of any
quantity effects in the price function (1). Observe
that the optimality condition for D3’s investment
is the same as in the first-best situation. However,
the actual investment level is not first best sinceD1
and D2 do not behave accordingly but renounce to
any investments. Summing up, for transfer prices
based on variable costs with small markup factors
the optimal investment levels and profits emerge
as given in Table 1.
B.3 Transfer prices based on full costs
With transfer prices basedon full costs, themarkup
factors are ω1 and ω2. Under the assumption that
production takes place, i.e., xf (I1, I2, I3) = x¯, deriv-
ing divisional profits with respect to the divisions’
investment levels yields
(27)










− 1 if i = 3 .
Consider the case with administered prices with-
outnegotiations.HQcanchoosenegativemarkups,
which yields the same optimal investment levels
and total profit as under scheme vwhich can be in-
ferred fromcomparingTable2withTable 1. Table 3
summarizes the results for negotiated scheme f .
Table 1: Investments and profits for scheme v















































Table 2: Investments and profits for administered scheme f (negative markups)























































Table 3: Investments and profits for negotiated scheme f




























































+ a1 + a2
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B.4 Numerical results
In the following, we calculate the profits for dif-
ferent parameter settings. The upper bound of the
sales price is given by p¯ = 30, the scaling parame-
ter θ is set to 50, the variable production costs of
the divisions are c1 = c2 = c3 = 1 and the (max-
imum) sales quantity is x¯ = 3. The capital-stock
endowment of division 3 is a3 = 2.5, whereas a1
and a2 can be inferred from the column and row
headings in the tables. All numbers are rounded to
two digits after the decimal point.
We give a reading example for Table 4 showing
the model results for the first-best case: Consider
the entries for a1 = a2 = 1. Here, the investment






D3 only invests I
fb
3
≈ 1.00. Divisional profits are











≈ 71.50. Obviously, in
the optimum capital stocks after investments are
equal in all divisions, meaning the marginal rates
of capital productivity are equal over the three
divisions ex post. Consequently, total profits only
differ due to varying investment costs.
In Table 5 the results are presented for trans-
fer prices based on variable costs (scheme v) with
smallmarkups. In addition to the parametersmen-
tioned above, the markups γ1 = γ2 = 0.1 are intro-
duced. As stated in the paper, D1 and D2 cannot
Table 4: Numerical example for the
first-best case
a1
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 a2
Ifb
1
2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00
Ifb
2
2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50
Ifb
3












71.50 72.00 72.50 73.00
Ifb
1
2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00
Ifb
2
2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00
Ifb
3












72.00 72.50 73.00 73.50
Ifb
1
2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00
Ifb
2
1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50
Ifb
3












72.50 73.00 73.50 74.00
Ifb
1
2.50 2.00 1.50 1.00
Ifb
2
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Ifb
3












73.00 73.50 74.00 74.50
Table 5: Numerical example for scheme v
a1
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 a2
Iv*
1
0 0 0 0
Iv*
2
0 0 0 0
Iv*
3















































59.01 63.50 66.18 68.01
Iv*
1
0 0 0 0
Iv*
2
0 0 0 0
Iv*
3















































63.50 67.17 69.36 70.85
Iv*
1
0 0 0 0
Iv*
2
0 0 0 0
Iv*
3















































66.18 69.36 71.25 72.55
Iv*
1
0 0 0 0
Iv*
2
0 0 0 0
Iv*
3















































68.01 70.85 72.55 73.70
be motivated to invest. Further -- as no quantity
effects occur -- divisional profits of D1 and D2 re-
main stable over all combinations of capital stocks.
In contrast,D3 invests less the higher the other di-
visions’ capital stocks are, thereby raising its own
profit.
Table 6 exhibits the results for administered trans-
fer prices based on full costs (scheme f ) without
negotiations over the investment levels. Here the
parameters ω1 = ω2 = −0.1 are introduced. Note
that they are negative in order to prevent the co-
ordination problem explained in the paper. Since
D1 andD2 still cannot be motivated to invest, total
profits remain unchanged compared to Table 5.
However, due to differing transfer prices the allo-
cation of total profit among the divisions alters.
Table 7 provides the results for negotiated transfer
prices based on full costs. Note that in comparison
to scheme f with negative markups inverse invest-
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ment incentives are induced, i.e., the upstream
divisions are motivated to invest whereas D3 re-
strains from investment. As shown in the paper,
D1’s and D2’s decisions leave D3 with zero profit.
Furthermore, uncountablymany pairs (ω1,ω2) ex-
ist which generate the presented investments. By
setting ω1 = 7 and adjusting ω2 appropriately we
arbitrarily choose one of them. The notably high
markup factors are due to the parameter setting.
Table 6: Numerical example for
administered scheme f (negative
markups)
a1
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 a2
If *
1
0 0 0 0
If *
2
0 0 0 0
If *
3















































59.01 63.50 66.18 68.01
If *
1
0 0 0 0
If *
2
0 0 0 0
If *
3















































63.50 67.17 69.36 70.85
If *
1
0 0 0 0
If *
2
0 0 0 0
If *
3















































66.18 69.36 71.25 72.55
If *
1
0 0 0 0
If *
2
0 0 0 0
If *
3















































68.01 70.85 72.55 73.70
Table 7: Numerical example for negotiated
scheme f
a1
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 a2
ω2 5.05 5.72 6.40 7.08
If *
1
2.91 2.41 1.91 1.41
If *
2
2.91 2.91 2.91 2.91
If *
3
















































71.26 71.76 72.26 72.76
ω2 5.61 6.34 7.08 7.82
If *
1
2.91 2.41 1.91 1.41
If *
2
2.41 2.41 2.41 2.41
If *
3
















































71.76 72.26 72.76 73.26
ω2 6.28 7.09 7.90 8.72
If *
1
2.91 2.41 1.91 1.41
If *
2
1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91
If *
3
















































72.26 72.76 73.26 73.76
ω2 7.10 8.01 8.91 9.82
If *
1
2.91 2.41 1.91 1.41
If *
2
1.41 1.41 1.41 1.41
If *
3
















































72.76 73.26 73.76 74.26
Appendix C: Additional
explanations for Section 4.3
This appendix provides further explanations con-
cerning the negotiations under transfer pricing
based on full costs presented in Section 4.3. In par-
ticular, we first motivate why negotiated transfer
pricing does not maximize (expected) total profit
and then why the downstream division is not con-
sidered in the analysis of the negotiations.
At first glance, it might be surprising that, as a
result of our analysis, negotiated transfer pric-
ing is inefficient with respect to total profit, see
Propositions 1 and 6. One might rather expect
that the three divisions agree on maximizing total
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profit by choosing appropriate investments and di-
vide the maximal total profit among themselves by
means of the transfer prices. While this course of
action would produce Pareto-efficient (expected)
divisional profits, it is only feasible either if in-
vestments are contractible or if, given the agreed
transfer prices, it is in each division’s individual in-
terest not to deviate from the agreed investments.
In our setting, the investment decisions, Ii, are not
contractible; only the investments’ actual costs,
Ci, are. Since the investment decision only deter-
mines the investment’s expected actual costs, the
investment decision cannot be inferred fromactual
investment costs. Consequently, it is not feasible
to maximize total profit by contracting the invest-
ment decisions themselves or by a forcing contract
based on the associated investment costs. Enforce-
ability of an agreement on investments therefore
requires that it is a Nash equilibrium in the non-
cooperative investment game arising from the si-
multaneous investment choices at date 3. Since
the downstream division does not invest in equi-
librium, see Proposition 3, first-best investments
as given by Proposition 1 do not form an equilib-
rium and transfer pricing based on full costs does
not achieve first best.
In our model, negotiating investment levels for
positive markups basically means that the divi-
sions select one out of multiple equilibria in the
investment game. Each of these equilibria has the
property that the downstream division’s contribu-
tionmargin is zero, see expression (12). To see this
refer to Figure 3 and concentrate on the pair ω of




remember that Figure 3 is based on zero invest-




and I3 = 0 is I1 = I
fb
1
(0). The corresponding profit
for D1 is approximately 7.4. Any higher invest-
ment implies that D3 expects a negative contribu-
tion margin and thus does not market the product,
which leads to a negative profit for D1. Investing




(0)/2 the profit for D1 amounts to approx-
imately 4.7, while the corresponding contribution
margin for D3 is positive.
IncreasingD1’s investment thenmeans higher (ex-
pected) revenue for D3 due to the investment’s
positive effect on the sales price. Yet, the associ-
ated increase of the (expected) transfer payment to
D1 is even higher. Thus, increasing I1 lowers D3’s
contribution margin, while D1’s profit increases.
D3’s contribution margin is just exhausted and




Equivalent effects govern D1’s optimal reaction to
other investment levels chosen by D2 and D3, and
also apply for D2’s optimal investment reaction.
Hence, in any equilibrium of the investment game,
D3 incurs zero contribution margin. It is there-
fore not worthwhile for this division to invest, so
that, in equilibrium, D3 incurs zero profit. Since
this result holds for any pair of positive markup
factors, there is no effect of D3 taking part in the
negotiations, neither on the investment levels nor
on the markup factors.
Acknowledgments
The authors acknowledge comments received at
the EAA conference in Gothenburg, the confer-
ence of the German Operations Research Soci-
ety in Karlsruhe, and the conference of the Ger-
man Academic Association for Business Research
(VHB) in Dresden. Further beneficial recommen-
dations have been given by workshop participants
at the Otto-von-Guericke-University Magdeburg.
We would like to thank two anonymous refer-
ees and Rainer Niemann (the department editor).
Their comments helped to significantly clarify the
paper.
References
Anctil, Regina M. and Sunil Dutta (1999): Negotiated Transfer
Pricing and Divisional vs. Firm-Wide Performance Evaluation,
The Accounting Review, 74 (1): 87--104.
Baldenius, Tim (2000): Intrafirm Trade, Bargaining Power,
and Specific Investments, Review of Accounting Studies, 5 (1):
27--56.
Baldenius, Tim,StefanReichelstein, andSavitaA. Sahay (1999):
Negotiated versus Cost-Based-Transfer Pricing, Review of Ac-
counting Studies, 4 (2): 67--91.
Che, Yeon-Koo and Donald B. Hausch (1999): Cooperative
Investments and the Value of Contracting, The American Eco-
nomic Review, 89 (1): 125--147.
Chwolka, Anne and Dirk Simons (2003): Impacts of Rev-
enue Sharing, Profit Sharing and Transfer Pricing on Quality-
Improving Investments, European Accounting Review, 12 (1):
47--76.
Czechowicz, I. James, FrederickD. S. Choi, andVinodB.Bavishi
(1982): Assessing Foreign Subsidiary Performance: Systems
& Practices Of Leading Multinational Companies, Business
International Corporation: New York (New York).
Drury, Colin (2004): Management and Cost Accounting, 6th
ed., Thomson Learning: London.
130
BuR -- Business Research
Official Open Access Journal of VHB
Verband der Hochschullehrer für Betriebswirtschaft e.V.
Volume 3 | Issue 2 | November 2010 | 113--131
Eccles, Robert G. (1985): The Transfer Pricing Problem: A
Theory for Practice, Lexington Books: Lenham.
Edlin, Aaron S. and Stefan Reichelstein (1995): Specific Invest-
ment under Negotiated Transfer Pricing: An Efficiency Result,
The Accounting Review, 70 (2): 275--291.
Edlin, Aaron S. and Stefan Reichelstein (1996): Holdups, Stan-
dardBreachRemedies, andOptimal Investment,TheAmerican
Economic Review, 86 (3): 478--501.
Ernst & Young (2001): Transfer Pricing 2001 Global Survey,
Ernst & Young International Limited, http://www2.eycom.ch/
publications/items/transfpric/en.pdf (Access date: 2003-09-
03).
Ernst & Young (2003): Transfer Pricing 2003 Global
Survey, EYGM Limited, http://webapp01.ey.com.pl/EYP/
WEB/eycom_download.nsf/resources/Transfer%20Pricing%
20Survey%20Report_2003.pdf/$FILE/Transfer%20Pricing%
20Survey%20Report_2003.pdf (Access date: 2005-06-23).
Grabski, Severin V. (1985): Transfer Pricing in Complex Or-
ganizations: A Review and Integration of Recent Empirical
and Analytical Research, Journal of Accounting Literature, 4:
33--75.
Holmstrom, Bengt and Jean Tirole (1991): Transfer Pricing and
Organizational Form, The Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization, 7 (2): 201--228.
Horngren, Charles T., Srikant M. Datar, and George Foster
(2005): Cost Accounting: A Managerial Emphasis, 12th ed.,
Pearson Prentice Hall: Upper Saddle River (NJ).
Johnson, Nicole Bastian (2006): Divisional Performance Mea-
surement and Transfer Pricing for Intangible Assets, Review of
Accounting Studies, 11 (2/3): 339--365.
Lengsfeld, Stephan, Thomas Pfeiffer, and Ulf Schiller (2006):
Centralized versus Decentralized Transfer Pricing and Cost-
System Choice, Working Paper, SSRN.
Myerson, Roger B. (1981): Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and
the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems, Econometrica,
49 (4): 883--897.
Nash, John F. (1950): The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica,
18 (2): 155--162.
Nash, John F. (1953): Two-Person Cooperative Games, Econo-
metrica, 21 (1): 128--140.
OECD (1999): Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises and Tax Administrations, Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD): Paris.
Sahay, Savita A. (2003): Transfer Pricing Based on Actual Cost,
Journal of Management Accounting Research, 15(1): 177--192.
Simon, Hermann (1989): Price Management, North-Holland:
Amsterdam.
Tang, Roger Y. W. (1993): Transfer Pricing in the 1990s: Tax
and Management Perspectives, Quorum Books: Westport.
Wielenberg, Stefan (2000): Negotiated Transfer Pricing, Spe-
cific Investment, and Optimal Capacity Choice, Review of Ac-
counting Studies, 5 (3): 197--216.
Biographies
Anne Chwolka has held the Chair of Busi-
ness Economics and Accounting at the Otto-von-
Guericke-University Magdeburg since 2004. She
received her Diploma in Managerial Economics
and her Doctoral degree at Bielefeld University,
where she also completed her Habilitation. Her re-
search interests include decision analysis, internal
pricing, risk reporting, and performance measure-
ment.
Jan Thomas Martini, MA, Diplom-Kaufmann,
Dr., is a postdoctoral research and teaching asso-
ciate at the Chair of Management Accounting and
Operations Management at Bielefeld University
(Germany). He graduated in International Busi-
ness at ESC Rennes School of Business (France)
and in Business Administration at Bielefeld Uni-
versity, from which he also received a doctoral
degree. His research interests include managerial
accounting, in particular transfer pricing, indus-
trial services, and the links between managerial
accounting on the one hand and financial account-
ing and taxation on the other.
Dirk Simons has been Professor and Chair
of Business Administration & Accounting at
Mannheim University since 2004 and Head of
the Center of Doctoral Studies in Business Ad-
ministration since 2008. He studied Business Ad-
ministration and received his Diploma Degree at
Bielefeld University, where he also received his
doctorate and achieved his Habilitation. His main
fields of research are theory of accounting and
auditing, applied institutional economics, interna-
tional accounting, and convergence of managerial
and financial accounting.
131
